T his article introduces a general sociological readership to multiagent systems (MAS), a new computer simulation technology that has increasingly been used to describe and explain sociological phenomena. I use the term artificial societies to refer to social simulations using MAS. This article has two related purposes. My first purpose is to describe MAS technology and to contrast it with other social simulation technologies. In addition to their methodological implications, MAS increasingly touch on issues that have a long history within sociological theory. Consequently, my second purpose is to use these recent MAS to provide new perspectives on a range of contemporary issues in sociological theory.
Until the development of MAS in the 1990s, computer simulations of social phenomena primarily used analytics, or equation-based modeling (EBM). Examples include the utility functions of rational choice theory (e.g., Coleman 1990 ) and the system dynamics of macro-sociological and organizational models (e.g., Forrester 1968) . In EBM, the model is a set of equations (typically differential or difference equations), and the execution of the simulation consists of evaluating the equations (Halpin 1999; Parunak, Savit, and Riolo 1998) . Many sociologists are under the impression that EBM is the only computer simulation tool available to them; social simulation is considered to be a part of the American Sociological Association section on mathematical sociology. Recent survey articles on sociological simulation neglect MAS completely or mention them only in passing (Halpin 1999; Hanneman, Collins, and Mordt 1995; Meeker and Leik 1997) .
In an artificial society, the model is a multiagent system: a set of autonomous agents that operate in parallel and that communicate with each other. The earliest implementation of an artificial society was the famous checkerboard simulation of racial segregation of Schelling (1971) . Like Schelling's early simulation, artificial societies allow researchers to run virtual experiments, setting up a series of simulations to address a specific research question. The simulation consists of activating all of the agents and observing the macro behavior that emerges as the agents interact. In the 1990s, computer modeling techniques and computational power evolved to the point where MAS became a viable simulation tool for sociologists and economists. This approach to social simulation has rapidly gathered momentum among computer scientists; several edited collections have appeared (Conte, Hegselmann, and Terna 1997; Gilbert and Conte 1995; Gilbert and Doran 1994; Moss and Davidsson 2001; Sallach and Macal 2001; Sichman, Conte, and Gilbert 1998) , and a new journal has been founded, the Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation (http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/JASSS/).
MAS are already beyond the scope of any single survey; instead, I focus on a limited set of simulations that have relevance for sociological theory. I use these simulations to argue that MAS have attained a level of maturity where they have the potential to be useful tools for sociologists (also see Axtell 1999; Carley 2000; Macy and Willer 2002; Mihata 2000; Verhagen 2001 ). In addition to this methodological claim, I show that MAS provide new perspectives on contemporary discussions of the micro-macro link in sociological theory by focusing on three aspects of the micro-macro link: micro-to-macro emergence, macro-to-micro social causation, and the dialectic between emergence and social causation (cf. Archer 1995; Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel 1981; Sawyer 2001; Wiley 1988) .
MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS
MAS are computer systems that contain more than one computational agent. The agents are autonomous: They have control over their own behavior and can act without the intervention of humans or other systems. Interest in MAS among computer scientists was first driven by the development of multiprocessor computers in the 1980s and then by the rapid expansion of the Internet in the 1990s. The Internet is a type of MAS because it is constituted by thousands of independent computers, each running autonomous software programs and each capable of communicating with a program running on any other node in the network. Other contributing factors are the proliferation of powerful desktop computers resulting from the declining costs of computation and the research field of ubiquitous computing, which attempts to embed very small autonomous agents in many household objects, such as a shirt or a carton of milk, and to network them using wireless technology. As these technologies have evolved, there is an increasing need for more sophisticated formalisms that can better understand, manage, and predict the performance of complex systems that are composed of many computational agents.
The term agent does not carry the same connotations as it does in sociological theory. To understand the term's connotations, a brief history of MAS is helpful. MAS emerged in the mid-1990s and grew out of precursor systems with multiple interacting processes but in which the processes were not autonomous. The earliest precursor of MAS was object-oriented programming (OOP). In OOP, an object is a single computational process-an operating program-maintaining its own data structures and its own procedures. Objects communicate with each other using message passing. Each object has a defined set of messages that it is capable of receiving and responding to. When a message arrives at an object, the corresponding procedure, called a "method", is executed.
By 1990, artificial intelligence researchers had begun to use OOP to build distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) systems (O'Hare and Jennings 1996) . Whereas objects had typically been rather simple programs, DAI objects each contained sophisticated software to represent intelligent behavior. Unlike the AI systems of the 1970s and 1980s, which focused on isolated agents, the interaction of the group of agents was an essential aspect of each agent's intelligence and of the overall behavior of the system. In most DAI systems, the individual processing units were not autonomous; instead, the units were hierarchically organized around a single centralized controller (Connah and Wavish 1990:197; Conte, Gilbert, and Sichman 1998:1) . Gradually, researchers began to experiment with decentralization, designing distributed systems without any centralized controller, with each object having autonomy.
This shift to autonomy was foundational and led to the use of the term agent. An agent is situated in an environment and is capable of autonomous action in that environment (Wooldridge 1999:29) . The notion of action in an environment is critical and in part developed out of research in situated robotics (Agre 1995) . Because real-world environments are nondeterministic-constantly changing and not fully known by the agent-agents that interact directly with the environment must be capable of autonomous action. Because agents do not have complete knowledge of the environment, the same action performed twice (in two environments that seem identical to the agent) may have different results, due to unperceived yet important features of that environment. In particular, an agent's action may fail to have the desired effect.
Autonomous agents have control over their behavior and their internal state. Agents, unlike objects, can decline to execute the request of another agent or can respond by proposing to negotiate the parameters of the task. Thus, MAS raise a wide range of issues related to coordination and cooperation. The introduction of agents with autonomy has forced computer scientists to consider what sociologists have long called the problem of order: Why, and under what conditions, do individuals yield autonomy to social groups? How do social groups emerge and reproduce over time? Sociologists (e.g., Weber) and economists (e.g., Hayek, Menger, Smith) have long been concerned with the ways that unintended consequences of individual behavior can lead to unexpected macro-social outcomes.
Because MAS have no central control, they are complex systems in which the aggregation of agents' autonomous actions results in the global behavior of the system. MAS developers have discovered that the global behavior of these systems cannot always be predicted or derived from the properties of the component agents; the behavior can be known only by running the simulation (Gilbert 1995:150) . The global behavior is said to emerge from the agents and their interactions, and the process whereby macro behavior is generated from the simulation is called emergence. MAS developers begin by modeling individual agents and their interactions. The simulation is then run to see what macro patterns and processes emerge as the agents interact with one another. These emergent macro patterns are then compared to the empirically observed patterns of the society. Thus, artificial societies are micro simulations, simulations based on the properties of lower level units such as individuals, in contrast to macro simulations of the system dynamics variety, which attempts to directly model emergent macro phenomena. As such, MAS allow the exploration of what Coleman (1990) referred to as the foundations of sociology: the micro-to-macro relation.
The MAS community is loosely divided between those who focus on cognitive agents and those who focus on reactive agents (cf. Brassel et al. 1997; Moulin and Chaib-Draa 1996) . Cognitive agents have beliefs about the state of the environment, knowledge about actions and plans of actions, and knowledge about how their actions will affect the environment and the other agents. Cognitive agents have explicit goals, and they are capable of reasoning about how to achieve their goals; thus, they are also known as intentional or deliberative agents. Cognitive agents communicate using agent communication languages (ACL). Speech act theory is the explicit theoretical foundation for the two dominant industry standard ACLs: FIPA (http://www.fipa.org) and KQML (http://www.cs.umbc.edu/kqml/). The widespread acceptance of these standards allows agents designed by different research teams to communicate.
Unlike cognitive agents, reactive agents do not contain any internal representation of the world-neither the environment nor the other agents. They do not have explicit goals, and they do not reason about goals and plans. Instead, reactive agents are driven by simple condition-action rules, in which the conditions are certain features of the local environment of the agent. Reactive agents are also sometimes called behavioral agents because they respond directly to stimuli from the environment, unmediated by internal states. These agents have been used to model learning in configurations of neurons (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 1991) , flow in sand piles (Breton, Zucker, and Clément 2000) , and activities of social insect colonies (Drogoul, Corbara, and Lalande 1995; Sumpter and Broomhead 1998) . Reactive agents are similar to the model of the individual proposed in behaviorist versions of exchange theory (Emerson 1972; Homans 1958 ). Whereas cognitive agents evolved from the DAI tradition, reactive agent systems evolved from the artificial life (Alife) tradition . Somewhat independently of DAI, Alife research has continued to influence artificial society simulations.
Computer scientists have explored the possibility of using MAS for a wide range of applications, including industrial process control, combinatorial auctions and electronic marketplaces, channelallocation schemes for cellular phone networks, and network routing (see the proceedings of the 2000 International Conference on MAS for examples). As the MAS community expanded rapidly in the 1990s, several computer scientists and economists realized the potential of using MAS to model social systems. This line of work has been given various names, including agent-based social simulation, multiagentbased simulation, and artificial societies, the term used here.
MAS and EBM differ in several ways, and each technique has a different scope of applicability. Several of these contrasts were first noted by economists, who have used MAS to allow them to relax some of the assumptions built into neoclassical theory (Epstein and Axtell 1996; Moss 1998) ; others have been noted by computer scientists interested in modeling social phenomena (Parunak et al. 1998; Gilbert 1999b ).
• In an artificial society, the model consists of a set of agents that simulate the behaviors of the various entities that make up the social system, and execution of the model involves emulating those behaviors. In EBM, the model is a set of equations, and execution of the model involves evaluating the equations.
• System dynamics makes extensive use of macro-level observable variables (macro simulation), whereas artificial societies define agent behaviors in terms of micro-level individual factors (micro simulation). Thus, artificial societies are better suited to domains where the natural unit of decomposition is the individual; system dynamics may be better suited where the natural unit of decomposition is the macrolevel observable variable rather than the individual.
• Economics models of utility functions assume the rational actor of economic theory; however, economists have long realized that such an actor is not very realistic, but the mathematical methods of EBM make it difficult to relax this assumption. MAS, by drawing on cognitive science, allow the representation of actors that use a wide range of decision strategies, both rational and nonrational. For example, MAS allow consideration of the internal representations of agents and their processes of plan construction and implementation, thus avoiding the behaviorist tinge of most rational choice theory. The role of an agent's internal models of social obligations, commitments, and responsibilities can be simulated, thus allowing an exploration of different theories of the sociological actor.
• In most EBM methods, agents are represented as homogeneous, and agent behavior does not change during the simulation. In economics theory, a representative actor is modeled; in system dynamics simulations, highly aggregate models of individuals are used to model social processes. (Some simulations allow highly constrained forms of agent variation, such as assigning a distribution of trait values to agents.) MAS, in contrast, allow the modeling of populations of radically heterogeneous actors, and these actors may modify their behavior during the simulation.
• Much of sociology (structural functionalism, network theory) has been concerned with static equilibria and has neglected social dynamics. After the structural-functional consensus faded in American sociology, sociological theories-most notably, conflict theorybecame more concerned with social dynamics. System-dynamics EBM also support the exploration of social dynamics (Hanneman 1988) , but MAS provide a methodology to study the mechanics of the micro-macro relations underlying social dynamics.
RELEVANCE FOR ISSUES IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
In the above section, I briefly described the features of MAS and contrasted MAS with prior social simulation technologies, which I referred to as equation-based models. In the following, I turn to theoretical concerns. I discuss specific artificial societies, grouping these examples according to their relevance to three aspects of the micro-macro link in sociological theory: micro-tomacro emergence, macro-to-micro social causation, and the dialectic between emergence and social causation. Rather than attempt to provide an exhaustive survey of artificial societies, I have selectively chosen representative simulations based on their relevance to these issues. These discussions demonstrate how artificial societies can provide sociologists with new perspectives on some long-standing issues in sociological theory.
In the artificial society community, it is often said that "the model is the theory," reflecting the attitude that theories are abstracted models that are evaluated in terms of their fit with empirically observed data (Conte et al. 2001) . In sociology, theories come in many different forms, and they vary along a range of metatheoretic dimensions (Markovsky 1997; . The contribution of artificial societies to sociological theory will be primarily to theories of a certain type: those that are characterized by logical rigor and terminological clarity. called such theories axiomatic: They allow "precise and logical deductions from abstract principles to particular empirical hypotheses" (p. 12). Artificial societies resemble axiomatic theory in the sense that their propositions are explicitly stated (in the form of algorithms or program code) and valid derivations may be drawn systematically (by running the program).
1 For these reasons, artificial society models are somewhat more difficult to apply to more descriptive and discursive forms of theorizing. Nonetheless, at various points in the following discussion, I discuss ways that even relatively unformalized theories could benefit from MAS simulations.
THE EMERGENCE OF MACRO PHENOMENA FROM INDIVIDUAL ACTION
A long-standing issue in sociology has been how macro-structural phenomena emerge from individual actions. Concern with this microto-macro problem, also referred to as emergence, is found in sociological behaviorism, exchange theory, and rational choice theory, on one hand, and with the interactionism of pragmatist-influenced microsociological theory (e.g., Mead and Blumer's symbolic interactionism) on the other. Although most sociologists acknowledge that this is a fundamental intellectual problem for the discipline, sociological theory has not adequately theorized emergence and the micro-tomacro transition (Coleman 1987; Saam 1999; Sawyer 2001a ). For example, Coleman's (1987:171) emphasis on "foundations" was an attempt to address the failure of sociologists to develop models of emergence.
The emergence of macro from micro is perhaps the most interesting feature of artificial societies. In the artificial societies that I describe below, macro-structural phenomena emerge, attain equilibrium, and remain stable over time. Thus, artificial societies provide sociologists with a tool to explore the micro-to-macro transition. In the following, I provide examples of artificial societies that represent two types of micro-to-macro emergence: the emergence of social structure and the emergence of norms.
The Emergence of Social Structure
Several artificial societies have been created that begin with no social structure and in which differentiated and hierarchically structured groups emerge during the simulation. An early example of such a simulation is Schelling's (1971) checkerboard simulation of residential segregation, which showed that almost total segregation can result from even rather small tendencies toward like neighbors. In the following, I give examples of simulations of the emergence of opinion clusters, the emergence of clusters of commitment surrounding supranational states, and the emergence of hierarchically structured and differentiated groups.
The emergence of opinion clusters has been observed in a simulation by Nowak and Latané (1994) , in which agents behave according to Latané's theory of social impact. In this theory, the impact of a group of people on an individual's opinion is a multiplicative function of the persuasiveness of the members of the group, their social distance from the individual, and the number of the group members. At any moment during the simulation, each agent's opinion is determined by a multiplicative rule that derives its opinion from those of its neighbors. The outcome of this simulation is that opinion clusters emerge and remain in dynamic equilibrium, over a wide range of assumptions and parameters. The emergent equilibrium states contain multiple opinion clusters, and minority views remain active. Axelrod (1995) used an artificial society to explore the emergence of new political actors: supranational entities that can regulate resource use at the global level. In his model, each agent represents a national state, and in repeat runs of the model, clusters of commitment emerge surrounding strong states. Thus, higher level actors emerge from interactions among lower level actors. This is a simpler version of Coleman's (1990) theory of how corporate actors emerge from the rational action of component members. Yet despite its simplicity, the simulation allows an examination of the unexpected effects of micro-theoretical assumptions. For example, Axelrod's (1985) simulation reproduced historically observed patterns, such as imperial overstretch, when powerful empires are weakened by being dragged into fights involving weaker actors to whom they have developed commitments.
The purpose of the Emergence of Organized Society (EOS) project (Doran and Palmer 1995) was to investigate the growth in complexity of social institutions in southwestern France during the Upper Paleolithic period, when the archeological record indicates a transition from a relatively simple hunter-gatherer society to a more complex society with centralized decision making and several forms of differentiation, including division of labor, roles, and ethnicity. The EOS simulation was developed to explore various theories about the causes of this transition. For example, Mellars (1985) hypothesized that environmental change-resource deterioration as a result of the glacial maximum-led to the emergence of hierarchical, centralized decision making. The EOS researchers began by creating a virtual environment, drawing on the environmental historical data from the known archeological record, such as the extent of glaciation at each year and the corresponding resource deterioration. They then created an artificial society composed of agents that operated within this environment.
When the simulation begins, agents do not have any knowledge of groups or of other agents. Each agent has the goal to acquire a continuing supply of resources, and some of those resources can be acquired only through the cooperation of other agents. Thus, agents attempt to recruit each other to support their own plan of action. Based on these purely local rules of interaction, hierarchically structured groups emerge as the simulation is run. EOS supported Mellars's theory of this transition: Decreasing resources led to the emergence of more complex social structure. 2 An active area of theoretical work in MAS has been the study of deontic logic, extensions to predicate calculus that provide operators for conventions, responsibility, social commitment, and social laws (e.g., Dignum et al. 2000) . Because many MAS are designed with a specific engineering goal in mind, designers often explicitly design agents that are predisposed to coordinate with other agents (e.g., Fitoussi and Tennenholtz 2000) . Because there is no centralization in MAS, such norms must be programmed individually into each agent.
In Parsons's structural-functional theory, the "problem of order" is also resolved by shared norms. The integration function of social systems is served by the propagation of shared norms and conventions, via socialization of individuals into an existing social structure. Much of subsequent sociological theorizing about norms occurred within a functionalist framework, in which norms were hypothesized to serve various systemic functions such as integration and cohesion. Many sociologists have criticized the functionalist assumptions of this normative approach to the question of order. A commonly noted problem with structural-functional approaches is their inability to explain the dynamics of systems: How do norms emerge in the first place? For example, network theorists reject the functionalist view of norms, arguing instead that analysts should look for integration in the network of connections linking individuals (Burt 1982) . This is a more objectivist approach because it focuses on observable behavior rather than subjective belief (Wellman 1983:162) .
A range of artificial societies are relevant to these sociological debates, including both simulations that impose norms in structuralfunctional fashion and simulations in which norms emerge during the simulation.
Many artificial societies impose norms and examine the resulting changes in the macro phenomena that emerge, contrasting the behavior with utilitarian rational actor systems in which there are no norms. For example, an artificial society by Conte and Castelfranchi (1995) explored how the introduction of norms affected macro emergence in a simple society of food eater agents. The agents were placed in an environment with randomly scattered food. Eating food increased an agent's energy, whereas fighting with another agent to take their food reduced both agents' energies. First, they ran the simulation with no norms, in which all agents acted according to personal utility. Agents frequently attacked other agents to take their food. After the simulation reached equilibrium, the researchers calculated the average strength of all agents. In a second simulation, they introduced a norm designed to reduce the overall amount of aggression: "finders keepers," specifying that the first agent to find food has rights to that food and will not be attacked. The introduction of this norm dramatically reduced aggression among agents and resulted in a correspondingly higher average agent strength once the society had reached equilibrium. They also found that the normative society was more equitable, with a smaller variance in strength of agents.
This simulation shows how artificial society methods can be used to explore the macro implications of the introduction of norms. However, in this simulation, the norms were imposed by the designers, rather than emerging from the agents themselves. Such normative agents are not truly autonomous because they do not create nor choose their own norms. Note the similarities between these artificial societies and variants of sociological functionalism in which cooperation and common interest always result due to the functional requirements of the system (cf. Castelfranchi and Conte 1996) .
Although designer-imposed norms can be an efficient solution to many engineering problems, such systems do not address some fundamental theoretical problems raised by autonomous agents: How do norms emerge in the first place? Why does an agent agree to adopt the goal requested by another agent? Why yield autonomy to a group?
In addition to these theoretical concerns, engineering considerations have also led MAS designers to explore how norms might emerge during the simulation. In some applications, not all system requirements are known at design time, the goals of agents might be constantly changing in response to environmental changes, and in very complex systems, designers may find it quite difficult to design effective social laws.
Thus, for both theoretical and practical reasons, MAS developers became interested in exploring how norms might spontaneously emerge from the local interactions of individual autonomous agents. If autonomous agents seek to maximize personal utility, then under what conditions will agents cooperate with other agents? In game theory terms, this is a Prisoner's Dilemma problem (Lomborg 1996:278, 284) . Purely self-interested agents have no desire to invest the resources in collaboration because they do not know if the other agent will also cooperate. Many studies of cooperation in MAS have been implementations of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), in which agents interact in repeated trials of the game and agents can remember what other agents have done in the past (Axelrod 1984 (Axelrod , 1997 . Many MAS have been developed to simulate variations of the IPD, including the introduction of noise and of bounded rationality (Cox, Sluckin, and Steele 1999; Lomborg 1992 Lomborg , 1996 Macy and Skvoretz 1998; Sullivan, Grosz, and Kraus 2000) .
In IPD-based artificial societies, agents cooperate even though norms of cooperation are not preprogrammed. In fact, norms of cooperation are not explicitly represented anywhere in the system; rather, cooperation is a component of the utility function. Thus, IPD agents are not normative in the sociological sense of the term because norms are not internalized and shared by all agents. In the late 1990s, artificial societies were developed in which explicit, internal norms emerged during the simulation. One of the first attempts was Walker and Wooldridge (1995) , who extended Conte and Castelfranchi's (1995) system of food eaters described above. In their extension, a group of autonomous agents reached a global consensus on the use of social conventions, with each agent deciding which convention to adopt based solely on its own local experiences. They found that global norms emerged in each of 16 different simulations, each using a different strategy update function. Once the global norm emerged, the system remained at equilibrium. For example, one strategy update function was a simple majority function: Agents change to an alternative norm if so far they have observed more instances of it in other agents than their present norm. They found that each of the 16 functions resulted in a different amount of time before all of the agents converged on a single norm. Each of the functions also resulted in a different average number of norm changes; because changes in norm can be costly for an agent and can lead to overall inefficiencies in the system, it is preferable for designers to choose an update function that results in the fewest norm changes while attaining norm convergence as quickly as possible. Steels (1996) implemented a series of simulations in which agents have the task of learning how to communicate with each other about objects in their environment. They begin without any shared names for these objects. Steels explored a range of artificial societies in which all agents attain global agreement on a lexicon for these objects, by playing successive rounds of the naming game. In the naming game, a speaker attempts to identify an object to a hearer, based on pointing and using a name. The game succeeds if the hearer correctly guesses the object chosen. If a speaker does not yet have a name for the object, the speaker may create a new name. A hearer may adopt a name used by a speaker. Both players monitor use and success, and in future games, they prefer names that succeed the most. In Steels's artificial societies, all agents gradually attain global coherence: They all use the same name for any given object. The resulting lexicon is an emergent property of the system. Each agent engages only in local dyadic interactions, and no agent has any awareness of the overall state of the system. Steels and Kaplan (1998) then extended the simulation to allow for changes in the agent population. After global coherence is attained, one agent (out of 20 total) is allowed to change in every N games. When N = 100, the language remains stable (although the global coherence measure drops slightly), with new agents acquiring the language of the other agents in the group. These new agents occasionally create a new word for an object, but this word quickly gets rejected, dominated by the preferred word of the rest of the group. When N = 10, however, the language disintegrates, and coherence cannot be maintained.
In the above examples, structures and norms emerge from the interactions of autonomous agents. These simulations provide support for methodologically individualist accounts of macro-social phenomena and allow rigorous examination of theories concerning emergence in the micro-to-macro transition. They also provide a perspective on a related problem in sociological theory: Once a macro pattern has emerged, how is it maintained over time? Some sociological theorists have suggested that emergence and maintenance are similar processes (Giddens) , others that they are analytically distinct (Archer) . 3 The above artificial societies show that emergence and reproduction of structure are not necessarily distinct mechanisms and may not require distinct theories. In these simulations, macro patterns emerge and then are reproduced through the same dynamic processes. These macro patterns are similar to the equilibrium states of economics, which emerge from independent rational action, and they are dynamically maintained; thus, they are demonstrations of the functionalist concept of dynamic equilibrium.
Artificial societies suggest how structural theory can be extended to model social change. Parson's structural-functional theory was widely perceived to be capable of modeling only societies that remained in homeostasis. Contemporary structural theories, such as network analysis, are criticized on the same grounds. Artificial societies model both stability over time (the "problem of order") and social change. In this sense, artificial societies suggest a form of structural theory that can potentially explain processes of emergence, conflict, and change: Stability emerges from dynamic processes, and those same dynamic processes can result in future change in response to change in environmental conditions (as in EOS). The Comtean distinction between static and dynamic sociology is blurred.
In all of the above artificial societies, stable macro structures emerge, and these differ depending on the models of individual agents and their interactions. 4 This seems to suggest that the extreme structuralist position-that macro structure is the only appropriate subject of analysis for sociology and that individuals do not need to be theorized (e.g., Mayhew 1980)-cannot be maintained (these issues are further explored in the Mutual Relations section). These simulations demonstrate the sorts of emergence hypothesized by Blau's (1964) early exchange theory, which proposed that social differentiation emerged from exchange processes. The MAS view of micro-to-macro emergence is also consistent with Collins's (1981) radical microsociology, which holds that "macrophenomena are made up of aggregations and repetitions of many similar microevents" (p. 989). The simulations of Axelrod and Nowak and Latané can be seen as demonstrations of such emergence. These demonstrations are also consistent with the methodologically individualist claims of rational choice theory (Coleman 1990 ).
THE INFLUENCE OF MACRO-STRUCTURAL PHENOMENA ON INDIVIDUALS
MAS developers often find it convenient to think of the emergent properties of the system as influencing the actions of the agents (Gilbert 1995:149) . In any of the MAS in the first section, once the overall system has attained equilibrium, this equilibrium macro state could be said to constrain individual agents from changing their behavior. For example, in Nowak and Latané's (1994) artificial society, we saw that agents' collective actions resulted in the emergence of opinion clusters. Once the clusters emerge, it appears that they influence the local behaviors of the agents. New agents in Steels and Kaplan's (1998) simulation could be said to be constrained to adopt the emergent language already in use by the rest of the agents. In this sense, MAS demonstrate a kind of macro-to-micro causation: As the simulation proceeds, the agents and their dynamics change, and at any given moment in simulation time, agents' behaviors are determined by their local context within the currently emergent global pattern. This has led some MAS researchers to claim to have modeled both directions of the micro-macro relation (e.g., Conte and Castelfranchi 1996; Kennedy 1997; Lomborg 1996) . This is the notion of social causation held to by methodological individualists-that social causal laws are mere shorthand for what ultimately goes on between individuals (Coleman 1990:20; Elster 1989:158) . Artificial societies represent a pure form of methodological individualism; they provide explanations of social phenomena in terms of individuals and their interactions. Artificial societies are methodologically individualist when they contain only explicit representations of individual agents and of their interactions, and the macro behavior that emerges is said to be explained by the simulation (cf. Conte et al. 2001 ). For example, there is no explicit mechanism by which Nowak and Latané's emergent clusters cause agents to do anything; agents do not perceive the clusters and are affected only by their local neighbors. Note that these are not macro-to-micro effects in the macro-sociological sense because actors are affected only by local interactions with neighboring agents, not by the macro properties of society (Castelfranchi 2001; Sawyer 2001a, forthcoming) . The causal status of these emergent macro-structural phenomena is unclear; they seem to have no independent causal power (Bedau forthcoming). These models are consistent with the claim of methodological individualists that although social causal laws may be a useful shorthand, social properties do not actually have causal power over agents.
However, there are also several MAS that provide support for the arguments of structural sociologists-that macro phenomena can be scientifically studied without regard for the nature of the individuals occupying the society. This is because of the design necessity of specifying the network topology of the simulation before running the model; the network topology corresponds to the macro properties of both network theory and structural sociology. In this section, I describe three simulations that demonstrate how a change in structural features-network topology, social groups, and size of the society-results in changes in the bottom-up processes of micro-tomacro emergence.
Axtell (2000) conducted a simulation experiment in which he kept every feature of the simulation constant, except for the network of connections among agents. The purpose of the simulation was to reproduce an observed macroeconomic pattern in retirement age. Economists have been puzzled by the fact that although the United States government changed the social security law in 1961, allowing retirement as early as 62, the mean retirement age of the population did not shift from 65 to 62 until almost 30 years later, between 1990 and 1995. In an earlier version of this experiment, Axtell and Epstein (1999) had developed a reactive agent simulation that reproduced this pattern. The agents are connected in random graphs-each agent is randomly connected to n other agents. The simulation contains three types of agents: rational agents, which retire at the earliest age permitted by law; imitators, which play a coordination game in their social network, shifting their preferred retirement age once a certain threshold percentage of their connected agents had done so; and randomly behaving agents, which retire with some fixed probability as soon as they are able.
The model reproduces the empirically observed lag time, with ebb and flow in the preferred retirement age, until the new social norm is established (retirement at 62). The lag time decreases as the percentage of rational agents is increased. Once the new norm is established, it remains quite robust; in no simulation does the retirement age rise again, once the new norm of 62 has been established. Thus, as in the examples of the first section of this article, the artificial society simulates both the emergence of equilibrium and reproduction of the equilibrium state once it has emerged.
Viewing a visual representation of the network while the simulation is running, one can see that the new retirement age first becomes established among older cohorts (many years older than 65) and is then propagated to younger agents, eventually reaching the age 65 cohort and shifting their retirement age down to 62.
5 Thus, the model behaves as if the retirement age were diffusing through the population from older to younger individuals. Axtell (2000) then modified the network topology to be a lattice network (a checkerboard grid with each agent connected to all agents within n spaces) rather than a random graph, keeping all other aspects of the simulation identical. He found that this systematically altered the overall behavior of the society. In a lattice network, the new social norm arises more quickly, regardless of the percentage of rational agents. In addition, viewing the visual representation of the simulation shows a different dynamic to the transition. In contrast to a propagation from older to younger individuals-as observed in the random network-the lattice network shows the new retirement norm beginning first with a few agents of age 65, then growing outward within that cohort, then gradually propagating to older agents as that cohort ages. The social change occurs via a different mechanism than in the random graph network.
These two models demonstrate that the macro properties of the network-not themselves emergent-have causal influence on the micro-to-macro processes of emergence. In both cases, a new social norm of retirement at age 62 is established with a lag. However, the dynamics of the transformation are quite different in the two network topologies. In a random network, the new norm is first established among older agents and then propagates to younger agents; in a lattice network, the new norm is first established among an age 65 cohort and then propagates upward as that cohort ages. This sort of micromacro study of social dynamics is almost impossible to analyze in any detail without artificial society methodology.
In a second example of macro effects on emergence, the sociologists Macy and Skvoretz (1998) developed an MAS to explore the evolution of trust and cooperation between strangers. In prior simulations of the prisoner's dilemma, trust emerged in the iterated game with familiar neighbors, but trust did not emerge with strangers. Macy and Skvoretz hypothesized that if the agents were grouped into neighborhoods, norms of trust would emerge among neighbors within each neighborhood and that these would then extend to strangers. Their MAS contained 1,000 agents that played the Prisoner's Dilemma game with both familiar neighbors and strangers. To explore the effects of community on the evolution of Prisoner's Dilemma strategy, the simulation defined neighborhoods that contained varying numbers of agents: from 9 agents per neighborhood to 50. Different runs of the simulation varied the embeddedness of interaction: the probability that in a given iteration, a player would be interacting with a neighbor or a stranger. These simulations showed that conventions for trusting strangers evolved in neighborhoods of all sizes, as long as agents interacted more with neighbors than strangers (embeddedness greater than 0.5). The rate of cooperation among strangers increased linearly as embeddedness was raised from 0.5 to 0.9. Simulations with smaller neighborhoods resulted in a higher rate of cooperation between strangers: at 0.9 embeddedness, the rate of cooperation between strangers was 0.62 in the 10-member neighborhood simulation and 0.45 in the 50-member neighborhood simulation (p. 655). Macy and Skvoretz (1998) concluded that these neighborhoodscharacterized by relatively dense interactions-allow conventions for trusting strangers to emerge and become stable and then diffuse to other neighborhoods via weak ties. If an epidemic of distrusting behavior evolves in one segment of the society, the large number of small neighborhoods facilitates the restoration of order (p. 657). Like the Axtell experiment above, this simulation demonstrates that social structure can influence micro-to-macro emergence processes; cooperation with strangers emerges when agents are grouped into neighborhoods but not when they are ungrouped.
Several simulations (Cox, Sluckin, and Steele 1999; Ray and Hart 1998) show that the size of the network-a nonemergent macro property-affects the emergent macro behavior. This supports a longstanding claim of structural sociologists (e.g., Blau 1970) . For example, Ray and Hart (1998) ran simulations in which they varied the number of agents in the simulation; they found that as size changes, the types of macro phenomena that emerge change. In systems of agents operating with imitation algorithms, they found that in a small network, mob behavior can be severe, whereas in a larger network, the mob behavior is diffused. Thus, the same micro simulation, but with different group sizes, can give rise to different macro behaviors.
Many sociologists make a distinction between small groups and more complex macro-social structures. Blau (1964) , for example, proposed that small group structures could be emergent but not large collective structures, "since there is no direct social interaction among most members" (p. 253). Blau distinguished between micro structures (interacting individuals) and macro structures (interacting groups): "Although complex social systems have their foundation in simpler ones, they have their own dynamics with emergent properties" (pp. 19-20) . In contrast, artificial society methodology assumes that the dynamics of small and large groups are fundamentally the same, even though different properties may emerge in societies of different sizes. The computational power of MAS techniques provides sociologists with a tool to extend the interactional method of Blau (1964) and of network exchange theory (e.g., Markovsky 1987; Smith and Stevens 1999) to larger social groups.
These experiments support some claims of structural sociologists: Network topology and size have a causal influence over the social dynamics of the population, and this influence is independent of the models of the individual agents (although see the Mutual Relations section below).
6 Such phenomena are consistent with structural sociology (Blau 1977; Mayhew 1980) . For example, Mayhew (1980) argued that sociology should be concerned with structural phenomena that have effects regardless of the nature of the entities occupying the nodes of the network, whether they be grasshoppers or people. Axtell's simulations also provide support to network theorists that claim that network phenomena cannot be explained by aggregating the properties of actors and that network analysis does not need to consider individuals as causal forces (e.g., Wellman and Berkowitz 1988) . Artificial societies provide some support for this emphasis and are compatible with the network theory tradition.
In Axtell's pair of simulations, the macro property "random graph or lattice network" causally influences the bottom-up processes of emergence. Because Axtell's simulations contained only reactive agents-agents that have no internal social representations-this form of social causation occurs without internalization or subjectivity on the part of the agents. The fact that such social causation is observed even in artificial societies with reactive agents mitigates against subjectivist claims, such as those of Giddens (1984) , that social structures and systems cannot exist unless individuals have a sophisticated knowledge of social activities, which Giddens called practical consciousness. Giddens claimed that "structure has no existence independent of the knowledge that agents have about what they do in their day-to-day activity" (p. 26). Yet reactive agent societies demonstrate the emergence and reproduction of social structure, even though agents have no internal representations (although see the Mutual Relations section below). Giddens (1984) explicitly rejected the notion that objective social structures could emerge from individual action, holding instead that "structure is not 'external' to individuals: as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain sense more 'internal' than exterior" (p. 25). As Cohen (1989) wrote in his overview of structuration theory, a practice orientation "entails dispensing with all arguments for the emergence of social patterns . . . the routine repetitions of institutionalized modes of interaction between agents is not something apart from the patterns they form" (pp. 76-77).
However, artificial societies demonstrate that these claims are not necessarily true; objective structures can emerge, and the existence of those structures can constrain individual agents (via changes in patterns of local interactions), even when agents have no internal representations. Structuration theory could be modified to be compatible with such simulations; after all, in both artificial societies and structuration theory, the emergent social structure is produced and reproduced by an agent's continued situated actions, even as that structure constrains those constituting agents. Such an extension of structuration theory would have to become more objectivist, limiting the emphasis on an individual's practical knowledge, while at the same time acknowledging some theoretical role for emergent social structure (cf. Contractor et al. 2002; Layder 1987) .
Network analysts have traditionally used methods of matrix algebra and EBM that were originally developed in the 1970s and early 1980s (e.g., Burt 1982) . Network analysis is ripe for the introduction of MAS methods because they allow the evaluation of several unresolved issues. For example, artificial societies could be developed that would allow an exploration and a reconciliation of the opposition between exchange theory and network analysis (Cook and Whitmeyer 1992) . Artificial societies also allow the extension of network theoretical models to dynamic simulations, addressing the frequent criticism that network analysis is overly static and structural (e.g., Burke 1997) . Several artificial societies show how network structures can emerge from individual actions, for example, the emergence of opinion clusters in Nowak and Latané (1994) and simulations of how groups emerge in networks with both strong and weak links (Chwe 1999; Smith and Stevens 1999) . These artificial societies show how structure emerges from individual actions and interactions and then is reproduced over time via the same dynamic processes.
THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTION AND MACRO-SOCIAL STRUCTURE
The dialectic of emergence and social causation remains one of the most pressing issues in contemporary sociological theory: How do macro-social phenomena emerge from individual action, and then, in turn, constrain, limit, and influence future action? Although artificial societies offer helpful perspectives on various components of this process, they are just beginning to address this most intractable aspect of the micro-macro link (cf. Castelfranchi 1998; Conte and Castelfranchi 1996; Sawyer 2001b) .
In the first section of this article, I presented examples of systems in which macro structure emerged from individual action (micro-to-macro). These simulations are consistent with individualist sociological theory, such as exchange theory and rational choice theory. In the second section, I presented examples of how macrostructural properties influenced the actions of individual agents (macro-to-micro); these simulations are more difficult to reconcile with individualism, and to an extent, they provide support to structural sociology and network theory.
However, note that in none of these simulations are both microto-macro and macro-to-micro modeled simultaneously. In those simulations in which macro properties influence individual action, those macro properties do not themselves emerge from the simulation but are specified in advance by the designer (cf. Castelfranchi 1998; Hales 1998). For example, in Axtell's simulation of retirement behavior, the network topology is a prespecified feature of the designer; it does not itself emerge from the actions of the agents during the simulation. In natural sociological systems, in contrast, macro patterns (network topology, group size, communication mechanisms, group and institutional structure) result from processes of social emergence, and only after this has occurred do future agents modify their behaviors under the influence of those macro phenomena. These twin processes are foundational in most contemporary theories of the micro-macro link, including those of Habermas, Giddens, Bourdieu, and Archer. Such theories attempt to integrate theories of the individual, individual agency, situated symbolic interaction, and social structure.
In the system dynamics tradition, multilevel simulation languages, such as MIMOSE (Möhring 1996) and Lisp-Stat (Gilbert 1999a) , allow modeling of both micro and macro levels and simulation of their interactions. Using these tools, individuals, groups, and societies can be modeled as nested objects, and equations can be specified to represent interactions among levels. Although advocates of multilevel simulation sometimes claim that they allow the representation of how individual actions can influence or modify macro variables (e.g., Saam 1999) , this is done using equations that connect individuals to macro variables that have already been created by the programmer, and the micro-to-macro relation is limited to rather simple types of aggregation. Consequently, multilevel models do not allow exploration of how macro structure emerges from individual action and interaction; there is no micro-to-macro emergence, in the MAS sense nor in Coleman's (1987) sense. This reflects the general tendency in sociological multilevel models to focus on the macro-to-micro relation (see DiPrete and Forristal 1994) .
There have been some intriguing first steps toward multilevel artificial societies. Such simulation tools include the CORMAS and SDML languages, and several of the tools developed for computational organization theory (COT) (Carley and Gasser 1999; Carley and Prietula 1994) . However, the macro-to-micro processes that are modeled do not originate from macro phenomena that themselves emerged from prior micro-to-macro processes. Instead, the macro features of the system are preprogrammed, as they are in system-dynamics multilevel simulation languages. The interactions of the micro units are allowed to modify or alter the macro level but within a predefined structure.
For example, Antona et al. (1998) used the CORMAS environment to simulate the management of renewable resources. The researchers first noted that the management of renewable resources may be based either on public interventions at the macroscopic level or on regulation of the microscopic level. They simulated two forms of micro regulation: direct interaction through local trade, or centralized exchanges through an auctioneer, such that general equilibrium processes set a global price. In both, agent trade behavior was based on neoclassical economic theory: an internal computation of welfare associated with exchanges. At the macro level, the simulation allowed the imposition of either a global quota (which directly affects the stock of the resource) or taxes (levied to each selling agent as a proportion of the resource sold).
These two variables allowed a 2 × 3 experimental design: micro level (local trade or centralized equilibrium) by macro level (no regulation, global quota, or taxes). Thus, the simulation allowed the examination of how macroscopic interventions affected micro-sociological interactions, at the same time that those interactions were giving rise to an emergent pattern of trade and price formation. The designers first began the simulation without any macro-level regulation and then waited for the global price to reach equilibrium. Then, they imposed one of the two macro regulatory schemes and examined how the overall dynamics of the system behavior changed.
The benefit of such a CORMAS simulation, compared to a system-dynamics multilevel simulation tool such as MIMOSE, is that autonomous, heterogeneous agents can be modeled, their interactions can be asynchronous and complex, and processes of emergence can be more complex than simple aggregation. Note, however, that as in MIMOSE, the macro intervention was imposed by the designer; it was not emergent from the actions of the agents.
Carley's COT (Carley and Gasser 1999; Carley and Prietula 1994 ) is an application of MAS techniques to the analysis of business organizations. COT simulations allow the explicit modeling of organizational structure, allowing the designer to enter parameters including authority structures, organizational procedures (for example, workflow), and skill requirements for different organizational positions (Carley and Gasser 1999:310-12) . Organizational structure includes not only the traditional hierarchical organizational chart but also the informal friendship networks among agents, the task structures (ordering among subtasks), the task-skill structures (defining which skills are required for which tasks), and the task-assignment structures (defining which types of agents are allowed to work on which tasks). In these models, agents are constrained by their organizational role, although within that role, agents are autonomous and make their own decisions. Researchers in the COT tradition have developed several modeling tools that allow the development of artificial societies with multilayered organizational structures. For example, Radar-Soar (Ye and Carley 1995) allows the explicit modeling of organizational structure and resource access structure. However, agents themselves do not create the organizational structure through emergence processes (although a few such models allow the agents to modify aspects of the organizational structure).
Like CORMAS, COT tools are an MAS variant of multilevel simulation languages. These models are typically descriptive at the individual level (describing individuals as boundedly rational or with cognitive biases) and normative at the structural level (attempting to find the best organizational design) (Carley and Gasser 1999:323) . Because the goal is to find the best organizational design to accomplish a given task, COT researchers are not as concerned with sociological issues of emergence; rather, they are searching for better ways to engineer organizations.
In their relevance to the sociological theory of micro-macro relations, these multilevel artificial societies suffer from two of the same problems as multilevel EBM. First, the macro interventions do not, themselves, emerge from the simulation but are imposed by the designer. Yet in actual societies, macro phenomena are themselves emergent from micro processes. In the second section, we saw how network structure changes the behavior of the simulation, and in the first section, we saw examples of structures emerging in simulations of autonomous agents. To date, no artificial society has brought together these two phenomena: In MAS, the network among agents does not emerge or change but is fixed by the designer (especially in reactive agent systems). But this is a key issue for sociological theory: How do individuals come together to form networks? What sorts of networks are created? How do these change over time? Note that these questions also tend to be neglected by network theory, which typically proposes a static, unchanging network. Yet in the first section, we saw examples of several artificial societies in which structures spontaneously emerge from micro simulation. It would be instructive to extend artificial societies so that agents can choose their neighbors and choose the strength of their connections. Multilevel variants of such models could allow higher level structural and institutional factors to influence the interactions and networking options available to agents.
A second problem in applying these multilevel artificial societies to sociological theory is that agents do not have any perception of the emergent collective entity (Castelfranchi 1998; Conte et al. 1998; Servat et al. 1998 ). In the CORMAS simulation, agents do not know that they are being taxed nor that a quota has been imposed. In the EOS simulation of group formation, hierarchically structured groups emerge during the simulation, as environmental change is introduced. However, although the social structure is visible to the human observer, it is not explicitly modeled by any agent (Doran and Palmer 1995:106) . Rather, groups are constructed from each agent's own "social model", where Agent A comes to perceive Agent B as its leader, and B also thinks of A as its follower. The complete network of these bilateral relations forms a hierarchically structured society, but only the human observer is aware of these macro structures. No agent has awareness of its own group as an entity, and agents who are not in a group have no way of recognizing that the group exists, or who its members are. Consequently, these agents have no ability to reason about social groups. ). Yet even in these artificial societies, although social agents have knowledge about the knowledge or capabilities of specific other agents, they do not have knowledge about emergent macro phenomena (Brassel et al. 1997; Moulin and Chaib-Draa 1996) . In agent simulations of the IPD, social knowledge is represented as memory about how another agent has behaved in past games. The social knowledge of EOS agents is limited to knowledge about which other agent is a leader and which other agent(s) are followers. And in COT models (e.g., Ye and Carley 1995) , although agents are said to have knowledge about the organizational structure, that knowledge is always modeled in terms of locally applicable rules; no agent has an internal representation of macro properties of these structures.
To some extent, artificial societies suggest that social theory can proceed without a theory of agency. This supports the arguments of structural sociologists that it does not make any difference whether you have reactive agents or cognitive agents; sociology should be the study of the networks and structures among agents and should leave the study of the agents to psychology (Mayhew 1980) . However, artificial societies also suggest that it is not possible to make a strict separation between network structure and agent design. In the artificial societies discussed above, the micro-macro relation changes dramatically as the model of the agent is changed. For example, agents with social knowledge (even as simple as memory in IPD simulations) result in different macro patterns, and agents with internalized norms result in different macro patterns than do agents with no norms. These findings reproduce an early network theory simulation study by Markovsky (1987) , which showed that changes in individual strategies affected the power and profit distributions that emerged in a three-actor exchange network. These findings support claims that an essential aspect of structural theory is the theorization of the individual (cf. Whitmeyer 1994).
CONCLUSION
I began this article by describing a new social simulation technology, multiagent systems (MAS). After discussing the methodological benefits of MAS, I turned to theoretical concerns. MAS allow rigorous explorations of a range of contemporary issues in sociological theory. To make this point, I grouped representative artificial societies around three aspects of the micro-macro link in sociological theory.
My purpose was to demonstrate that artificial societies are at a point where they can inform sociological theory.
THE LIMITS TO MICRO SIMULATION
The high degree of logical formalism used by computational theorists allows formal explorations of the computability and decidability of certain problems. For example, it is possible to prove that certain questions are mathematically undecidable, meaning that it is provably not possible to find an answer. It is also possible to prove that certain problems are computationally intractable, even though they may be mathematically decidable. Examples of such problems are the class of problems that mathematicians call NP complete and PSPACE complete. Wolfram (1985) argued that computational irreducibility of many naturally occurring systems is common; for many systems-those that can be proven equivalent to a universal Turing machine-the behavior of the system can be predicted only by direct simulation or observation. Wolfram's studies (e.g., 1984) proved that many reactive agent simulations are computationally irreducible. In other words, the only way to model the behavior of the system is by direct simulation, such that the model is essentially identical to the system being modeled. More recently, Wooldridge (2000) has proven that several agent design problems are PSPACE complete or undecidable.
If a system as simplistic as a reactive agent MAS can be computationally irreducible, then natural human societies are almost certainly computationally irreducible. If a social system is computationally irreducible, then the only way to model it is by direct (micro) simulation; this insight is the motivation driving artificial society researchers. The risk is that the simulation may then become as complex as the real world and therefore just as difficult to analyze as the phenomena being simulated, providing no explanatory power.
A complete micro description of macro-social phenomena is likely to be mathematically undecidable or uncomputable. If so, reductionist forms of artificial societies could never provide a complete simulation of a social system, and the goals of methodological individualismexplanation of macro-social phenomena in terms of individualswould be unattainable. Although a complete micro description may not be possible, a close approximation at the macro level may nonetheless be possible. Some social properties may be possible to explain in macro terms even if the micro simulation is not computable (Sawyer 2001a) . Social simulation may be required to proceed by relaxing the atomistic micro reductionism of current method, for example, by explicitly modeling emergent macro phenomena in addition to models of participating individuals (Edmonds 1999) .
IMPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES FOR SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
By demonstrating the emergence of structure from micro models of the individual actor, and the appearance of a sort of "social causation" even in such models, artificial societies demonstrate the plausibility of the methodologically individualist position. If macrostructural phenomena can be shown to emerge from a simulation only of individual agents and their interactions, then this suggests that sociological theory may be able to proceed without explicit modeling of the emergent macro level. These demonstrations provide support to the methodological individualism of rational choice and game theoretic models.
However, artificial societies do not provide unequivocal support for methodological individualism; several artificial societies provide support for the arguments of structural sociologists that network structures have causal effects on individual action. And computability concerns may ultimately show that a complete methodologically individualist explanation is impossible. Thus, artificial societies do not strongly support either sociological extreme, and they can be used as tools for theory development by advocates of both positions. As such, artificial societies can be viewed as implementations of hybrid sociological theories: theories that attempt to reconcile individual agency, subjectivity, and interpretation, on one hand, and structural and network phenomena, on the other. Artificial societies allow an exploration of the role of the individual and of how different theories of the individual relate to different hypotheses about the micro-macro each individual to directly perceive the entire social order. Instead, individuals' perceptions of macro-social phenomena are typically mediated by institutions, such as the mass media, government agencies, and educational institutions. To adequately simulate complex modern societies, artificial societies may need to explore the roles of such institutions.
Artificial societies have several benefits to offer sociological theory. They correspond to sociological theories that are axiomatic, well developed, and formal. Because they are formal theories captured in a computer program, they allow the implications of theories to be derived automatically and systematically. Thus, artificial society models can meet standards of consistency and completeness that sociological theories often have difficulty attaining.
I have selectively reviewed work in artificial societies, focusing on simulations that are particularly relevant to micro-macro issues in sociological theory. Artificial societies provide a novel perspective on the micro-macro link. They partially support both individualist and collectivist extremes of sociological theory. Artificial society methodologies can be used to rigorously implement and test hybrid micro-macro theories. More complex sociological theories can be developed, and unexpected consequences and internal conflicts can be identified. In this way, artificial societies have the potential to substantively contribute to sociological theory.
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